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1 |  INTRODUCTION
“Conspiracy theory” is widely used as a pejorative term. An effect of this usage, however, is to dis-
courage certain kinds of legitimate critical inquiry. In a world where conspiracies happen, it is rea-
sonable to seek to formulate good theories of what exactly is happening; and through competent 
investigation, hypotheses of conspiracy can sometimes be verified. Thus, the general denigration of 
“conspiracy theory” tends to discourage a kind of practice that there is reason, in fact, to encourage. 
Of course, this kind of serious inquiry is not necessarily typical of conspiracy theories more gener-
ally. Some researchers regard its instances as exceptions to a more general rule whereby conspiracy 
theories involve unwarranted assumptions and misleading speculation;1 others maintain— instead or 
as well— that such investigations as happen to identify a verifiable conspiracy should be exempted 
from the designation “conspiracy theory” and called something else.2 However, such suggestions 
presuppose not only that the grounds of exception or exemption can be clearly specified but also that 
the specification will be generally understood and applied. But what if neither presupposition turns 
out to be warranted?
That concern is at the heart of this paper: when the pejorative understanding of “conspiracy the-
ory” is allowed to influence policy- making it can serve to legitimate policies whose effect is to impede 
or even outlaw the kind of civic vigilance that aims to uncover malfeasance on the part of powerful 
actors. If all kinds of critical and unorthodox inquiry that challenge “official narratives” or institu-
tionally recognized epistemic authorities are potentially liable to be dismissed as “conspiracy theory,” 
then in the event of corruption or capture of institutions this may not only go undetected but could 
even be protected from detection. The concern is by no means purely hypothetical, and this paper will 
cite troubling evidence of such an inquiry being not only denigrated and marginalized but actively 
censored, with those pursuing it being vilified and even persecuted. Accordingly, a central claim here 
is that the public interest is not well served by general compliance with a default assumption that con-
spiracy theory should be understood in a pejorative sense.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri bution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Of course, the public interest is also not well served by the flooding of information channels by the 
kind of unfounded speculations and misleading claims that are commonly associated with conspir-
acism. And this countervailing concern has driven the extensive and growing literature across several 
disciplines that seeks to understand it as a cognitive and epistemic problem. Conspiracism— the elicit 
presumption that hypotheses of conspiracy explain every undesirable event, regardless of what reason 
or evidence suggest— involves, as Muirhead and Rosenblum (2019) put it, the positing of “conspiracy 
without the theory.” A proper theory— of a conspiracy as of anything else— treats reason and evidence 
with methodological rigour. Some theories about conspiracies will be rigorous, and others will not; 
some will succeed in explaining what they aim to, and others will fail. So although much of the liter-
ature does not clearly observe a clear distinction between the concept of conspiracy theory and that of 
conspiracism, there are good reasons why we should (Dentith 2017).
Accordingly, this paper shows that what can be problematic about conspiracy theories can be dis-
cussed, and more incisively, by excising prejudicial framings of the matter. As to be shown in Section 
2, there is no particular difficulty in operationalizing a conceptual distinction between conspiracy the-
ories that are methodologically rigorous and speculations about conspiracies that are not. This simple 
and robust approach has in fact already been developed by a number of philosophers who engage in 
applied epistemology. The approach allows that the term conspiracy theory— when not appended by 
an evaluative qualifier— can and should be used in a neutral sense. Any specific conspiracy theory 
may or may not be problematic, but this can only be known when it is evaluated. What makes a con-
spiracy theory problematic is the kind of fallaciousness in assumptions or methods that would make 
a theory about anything problematic, not the fact that it features conspiratorial hypotheses. This ap-
proach assumes that there is no inherent general defect that a respectable theory needs to prove itself 
exempt from. Hence any given conspiracy theory should be assessed on its particular merits.3
Nonetheless, because the opposite assumption is operative in some of the literature, the possibility 
to be canvassed in Section 3 is that there could be a particular kind of problem about conspiratorial 
hypotheses that is distinctive and inherent to them. When seeking to specify what may be inherently 
problematic about conspiratorial hypotheses, critics draw attention particularly to the degree of suspi-
cion, or scepticism they depend on. Granting reasonable assumptions about limits to how sceptical it 
is rational to be, a general objection to conspiracy theories would be that they quite routinely exceed 
these limits. An important consideration that can be appealed to in this argument is the essentially col-
laborative nature of knowledge in general and the fact that we must all depend on others virtually all 
of the time for knowledge that we cannot immediately access individually. This is why it is generally 
rational to defer to established epistemic authorities and not to suppose that an individual who from 
their own narrow perspective identifies some anomaly in received wisdom has necessarily gained an 
enlightened insight rather than merely a “little knowledge” of the kind that is a “dangerous thing.” 
However, the response commended in this paper is recognize that just as scepticism should not be 
unbounded, nor should deference. The collective production of reliable knowledge is by no means the 
sole preserve of accredited institutions of epistemic authority.
Section 4 highlights the practical significance of the critically receptive approach with a case study 
of a group of citizen investigators who have been very publicly stigmatized as conspiracy theorists. 
They have challenged an institution with clear epistemic authority in its field and thus their challenge 
would qualify, on several of the other approaches discussed in this paper, for being considered prima 
facie unwarranted. However, on the approach advocated, the salient question is whether the group has 
engaged in rigorous and competent investigation. As it transpires, the study reveals that the group's 
investigation has been endorsed by scientists of the institution in question, who complain of corruption 
and intimidation on the part of its management. The case thus illustrates the reality that even insti-
tutions with seemingly unimpeachable claims to epistemic authority do not necessarily stand above 
   | 3HAYWARD
and immune from political contestations over knowledge and truth claims. For this reason, skepticism 
about them cannot always or necessarily be condemned as irrational. The argument of this paper is 
that when trust in institutions diminishes, the answer does not lie in suppressing questions about their 
trustworthiness or seeking to deter potential questioners, but in taking steps to make them worthy of 
trust. Meanwhile, the fact that malfeasance by powerful actors can and does occur is ultimately itself 
sufficient reason to take an attitude of critical receptiveness to conspiracy theories.
2 |  CONSPIRACY THEORY AS BONA FIDE  EXPLANATION
Few, if any, events or situations in the human world can ever be adequately explained in terms of one 
causal factor or with the methods of one discipline. So when conspiracy is a factor, it is unlikely to 
be the only one and may not be the most significant. The term conspiracy theory is sometimes used 
in practice to refer to any explanation which includes that factor; some users of the term, however, 
reserve it for explanations that prioritize conspiratorial hypotheses; some even use it of explanations 
that may be prima facie absurd but involve no necessary conspiratorial hypothesis (e.g., “Flat Earth” 
theory). On the other hand, some rule out its applicability to an explanation that has a conspiratorial 
hypothesis at its core if this is accorded the status of official explanation: hence to talk about the 
conspiracy of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to perpetrate the attacks of 9/11 is not to qualify for 
the “conspiracy theorist” label. This latter position might be rationalized by claiming that “conspiracy 
facts” are not “mere conspiracy theories,” but that would beg crucial questions about what one calls 
a theory prior to its investigation and how it is verified that official explanations are epistemically 
authoritative; alternatively, it might be suggested that a “plausible theory of conspiracy theory” is a 
different kind of thing than a “conspiracy theory”; indeed, one author even suggests that we use the 
term Conspiracy Theory, capitalized, when we mean the latter kind of thing. However, no matter what 
semantic innovations might be engaged in, the core conceptual question remains, and most vividly in 
those cases where an explanation starts out as a seemingly extravagant speculation but is subsequently 
vindicated: are there any epistemic criteria in terms of which all, and only, conspiracy theories may 
consistently be defined?4
One suggestion would be to use the term of any theory that generates a conspiratorial hypothesis. 
To define the term by this use, though, would be to make it unavailable as a slur. For it is possible to 
engage in investigations involving a conspiratorial element while observing established principles of 
scholarly and scientific inquiry. This is recognized by Peter Knight, leader of a largescale collabora-
tive research project on conspiracy theories, who refers to “(plausible) theories of conspiracy” (Knight 
2014, 348). It is not just any assertion of the existence of a conspiracy that has a reasonable claim to 
be entertained and assessed, though: there needs to be a cogent hypothesis, supported by a logically 
coherent explanatory argument, whose key premises are not prima facie implausible. Since the plau-
sibility of a theory can only be ascertained by assessing it, an appropriate attitude to adopt, ex ante, 
toward any conspiracy theory, so understood, is one of critical receptivity.
This attitude differs markedly from that encountered in those research programs in the social and 
psychological sciences that regard conspiracy theories as a generic kind of cognitive phenomenon and 
construct them as a problematic object of inquiry.5 Typically, these less receptive approaches tend to 
focus on concerns about cognitive processes rather than epistemic criteria, and thus look not so much 
at the characteristics of the theories themselves as the personal and behavioral traits of conspiracy 
believers. Since the ways and means by which people come to hold or relinquish beliefs are many and 
various, this general question area is understandably of interest to psychologists and other behavioral 
scientists. Insofar as people form beliefs in relation to untested conspiracy postulates, the cognitive 
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processes involved can be treated as objects of inquiry. (The same could also apply, of course, to the 
psychology of those with marked resistance to entertaining conspiracy beliefs or with a high tolerance 
for concatenations of remarkable coincidences.6) It is as well to be clear, however, that the cognitive 
and behavioral scientists engaged in such research are not thereby normally claiming to establish any-
thing about the truth or epistemic justification of the ideas that their subjects of study do or do not be-
lieve in. Nor can they be presumed to know, in the case of conspiracy theories that are not implausible 
on their face, which of them are well founded or not, true or not, unless or until the specific questions 
have been properly investigated. This kind of investigation falls under the provenance of practical 
epistemology rather than social psychology.
So while there may be interrelationships between those different fields of investigation, the dis-
tinctiveness of each should not be ignored: the psychological studies of people who hold “irrational 
beliefs” are distinguishable from epistemological investigations of what beliefs it would be irrational 
to hold. This and related points have already been discussed by a number of philosophers writing 
about conspiracy theories from the perspective of applied epistemology. Indeed, something of a philo-
sophical school of thought has been emerging around the question of critically evaluating “conspiracy 
theory” as a rational form of intellectual inquiry (see e.g., Basham 2016, 2018; Coady 2007, 2018; 
Dentith 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Hagen 2010, 2017; Pigden 2016).
A general problem that can be stated at a descriptive level, however, and does have resonance with 
both epistemological and psychological concerns, is appropriately called conspiracism. The term con-
spiracism, as it is taken here, designates an attachment to a fallacious mode of reasoning that tends to 
reduce the explanation of events to posited conspiracies, without properly investigating the relevant 
evidence for alternative hypotheses.7 It can involve persistence in seeking a conspiratorial explanation 
even when wider inquiries have shown that factor not to be decisive or perhaps even operative at all. 
A conspiracist tendency is to see conspiracies where there is little evidence for them, without giving 
sufficient consideration to alternative explanations, and perhaps even being resistant to heeding quite 
compelling counter- indications. What is wrong with conspiracism, it may thus be noted, can be spec-
ified by reference to standards of inquiry that would characterize good conspiracy theory. For this 
reason, far from being interchangeable designations, the rational development of a serious conspiracy 
theory does not involve conspiracism and in fact can be seen as its antithesis. Thus when those who 
are unsympathetic to conspiracy theory of any kind use the terms interchangeably, they elide a crucial 
distinction. Moreover, just as one would not abandon the study of psychology, for instance, because 
some people make inappropriately reductive claims using it to explain things better understood in 
other ways— thereby committing the fallacy of psychologism— so there is no good reason to abandon 
the study of situations that could quite reasonably be suspected to involve conspiracies just because 
some people do it very badly.
A crucial point, though, is that to differentiate an instance of conspiracism from an instance of 
reasonable suspicion one needs to have independent criteria to establish the bounds of reasonableness. 
This is a matter of research methodology as applied to theory of conspiracy. One should accord-
ingly be clear that social scientific analyses of conspiracist tendencies in an individual's psyche or 
socio- cultural environment have no bearing on an understanding of the methods and conduct of the 
investigative practices of serious conspiracy theory as I am proposing we understand this intellectual 
activity.8 As will shortly be noted, the psychological disposition that supports a tendency to cleave 
to unreasonable conspiracy theories is also operative when scientists sometimes cling onto theories 
that their peers regard as no longer reasonable to maintain. One should thus be cautious about en-
dorsing the idea of a distinctively “conspiracist mindset.” This was developed in the work of Harold 
Lasswell and Franz Neumann, and it informed Richard Hofstadter's (1964) influential study of the 
political pathologies of the “paranoid style” in the 1960s. This association of conspiracy suspicions 
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with irrationality and paranoia was then actively promoted in the United States. Lance deHaven 
Smith notes that “the conspiracy- theory label was popularized as a pejorative term by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a propaganda program initiated in 1967.” (deHaven Smith 2013, 21) The 
program was created as a response to critical citizens' questions about the assassination of JF Kennedy. 
It “called on media corporations and journalists to criticize “conspiracy theorists” and raise questions 
about their motives and judgments.” Its reach has extended greatly since, and Knight takes it not to be 
particularly controversial now that “some of the labelling of particular views as ‘conspiracy theories’ 
is a technique of governmentality” (Knight 2014, 348). It is thus worth noting that a clear purpose for 
fostering the very concept of “conspiracy theory” has, in practice, been to disparage it so that people 
who desire to have a reputation as intellectually serious, or even just sensible, are discouraged from 
engaging in it.
If it were the case that all and only the designated conspiracy theories manifested distinctive falla-
cies associated with conspiracism, it would be reasonable to heed admonitions not to promote them. 
The problem is that those who use the term conspiracy theory to designate an intellectually disreputa-
ble activity cannot at the same time cogently define the term in such a way as to exclude intellectually 
respectable activities from its scope. It follows that to discern whether a “conspiracy theory” is worth 
taking seriously one has to be critically receptive to the possibility of its being so.
In order to ensure receptiveness is duly critical, a constructive proposal is that of Steve Clarke 
(2002, 2007). This would involve the same kind of epistemic due diligence as exercised with respect 
to a scientific theory. He advocates applying methodological principles such as commended in the 
philosophy of science by Lakatos (1970). On this approach, a constructively critical assessment of 
any theory, and a decision whether to adhere to it or to abandon it, centers on determining whether 
it is at the core of a progressive or a degenerating research program. This approach cuts through the 
prejudicial loadings of such designations as “official narrative” and “conspiracy theory” and directs 
attention to the issues that can potentially decide between contending accounts.
“In a progressive research program the proponents of a theory are able to anticipate new 
evidence and make predictions (and retrodictions) that are generally successful. By con-
trast, a degenerating research program is characterized by a lack of successful predictions 
(and retrodictions) and by the subsequent modification of initial conditions and auxiliary 
hypotheses after new evidence has come in.” (Clarke 2007, 167)
On this basis, the problem typical of conspiracists is that they are unable or unwilling to recognize 
when a theory they hold to has become demonstrably regressive. Their critics rightly regard persistent 
adherence to it as irrational, and they understandably look to psychological or ideological causes of this, 
since its cause is not a dispassionate epistemic estimate of what the evidence suggests.
Questions of psychology can impinge on epistemology due to the problem that in the real circum-
stances of controversy there are likely to be grey areas. As Clarke points out, although Lakatos plau-
sibly maintains that it becomes irrational, at a certain point, to continue to adhere to a degenerating 
research program, he offers no categorical guidance as to how and where exactly such a point can be 
located. Moreover, Clarke considers it “doubtful whether we could stipulate an exact point at which 
it becomes rational to abandon any particular theory” (Clarke 2007, 167). As philosophers of science 
more generally recognize, the mere fact of anomalous data “can never logically compel a scientist 
to abandon a particular hypothesis because the hypothesis is embedded in a network of beliefs, any 
one of which might be wrong” (Chinn and Brewer 1993, 10). So, if it can happen sometimes that a 
scientist clings to a theory that peers see as crumbling, it can likewise happen that a person maintains 
a conspiracy theory that most others would commend dropping. It is only with the development of a 
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comprehensively better theory that one can speak of the old one being refuted. It is possible meanwhile 
to adhere to a degenerating research program even as the rationality of doing so diminishes (Hayward 
2019, 545). It is in seeking to understand this adherence to hypotheses of diminishing epistemological 
rationality that psychological investigations may have a role to play.
Something important to appreciate, however, is that if adherence to demonstrably implausible hy-
potheses is a matter for behavioral analysis, then exactly the same line of inquiry can sometimes be ap-
propriate in relation to cognitive subjects' acceptance of hypotheses advanced in relation to the official 
narratives that conspiracy theories challenge. For sometimes official narratives too have features of a 
“degenerating research program.” In fact, it is precisely this that makes the activities of critical con-
spiracy theorists potentially valuable. Thus adopting the proposed approach keeps open the possibility 
of discovering that some conspiracy theories are not only methodologically rigorous but also have 
important insights to afford. So while the problem of conspiracism has a psychological dimension, 
another— and arguably more significant dimension of the problem— is the political contestation over 
truth that is a wider concern of the social sciences.
3 |  EPISTEMIC DEFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
CONSPIRACY THEORY
Notwithstanding the cogent arguments that philosophers have made for adopting a neutral under-
standing of conspiracy theory, research projects premised on a pejorative understanding have bur-
geoned in recent years. The aim of this section is to see how cogently and informatively such an 
understanding can be articulated. The challenge is to provide a definition of conspiracy theory as 
an irrational cognitive activity that differentiates this both from other— non- conspiratorial— kinds 
of irrational thought process and from intellectually respectable investigations into potential con-
spiracies. This means explicating what is wrong with conspiracy theories from an epistemological 
perspective.
Identifying exactly what the epistemological problem is supposed to be, however, is a surprisingly 
difficult task. Symptomatic of this is the remarkable lack of attention paid even to such a rudimentary 
question as that of how to define what the object of critique— a conspiracy theory— is. This is illus-
trated by the fact that in a recent edited collection of 30 differently authored chapters (Uscinski 2019), 
the sole contributor to address the question of definition, Matthew Dentith, is a representative of the 
philosophical school discussed in Section 2. The editor of the collection is evidently alert to the con-
spicuous omission and inserts a brief comment on definitions aiming to assure the reader that “ [i]n 
this volume, we try to keep our usage narrow and apply it as evenly as possible” (Uscinski 2019, 50).9 
This statement of editorial aspiration, however, sidesteps the crucial question already made clear in 
the early and influential remarks of Brian Keeley (1999) about defining “conspiracy theory”. Keeley 
suggested that a “bare- bones” definition could be offered readily enough, along these lines:
“A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) 
in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons— the 
conspirators— acting in secret.” (Keeley 1999, 116)
Keeley additionally notes a few things about this definition.
‘First, a conspiracy theory deserves the appellation "theory," because it proffers an expla-
nation of the event in question. … Second, a conspiracy theory need not propose that the 
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conspirators are all powerful, only that they have played some pivotal role in bringing about 
the event. … Third, the group of conspirators must be small, although the upper bounds are 
necessarily vague.’ (Keeley 1999, 116)
This can be considered a neutral definition because it does not imply anything inherently problematic 
about conspiracy theories in general.10
Problems only arise with the subset of them that Keeley calls unwarranted conspiracy theories 
(UCTs) on account of additional characteristics they exhibit. For instance, Keeley suggests, a UCT 
will run counter to an official story and take the intentions behind a conspiracy to be nefarious: UCTs 
also typically seek to tie together seemingly unrelated events and to take the truths behind events to 
be well- guarded secrets, even if the ultimate perpetrators are public figures. A problem with this aux-
iliary list of characteristics is that any of them, in any combination, could in principle also be found 
in a warranted theory. It follows from the fact that some cases of coordinated malfeasance have been 
revealed to have such characteristics that a warranted theory could refer to them.
To be clear, though, it does not suffice, for the warrant of a theory, that findings it claims to pre-
dict turn out to be true. This is a point that some critics of conspiracy theory have been at pains to 
emphasize, and Cass Sunstein seeks to illustrate: “I may believe, correctly, that there are fires within 
the earth's core, but if I believe that because the god Vulcan revealed it to me in a dream, my belief 
is unwarranted” (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 207).11 The “explanation” offered in such a “theory” 
would not pass minimal tests of plausibility or cogency. A fortuitously correct statement cannot be 
considered the warranted conclusion of a theory when the theory is faulty. What should also be un-
derstood, however, is that the difference between being warranted and being true cuts both ways. As 
in normal scientific inquiries, a theory may be warranted— because it rationally develops a line of 
investigation that pursues a reasonable hypothesis, as formulated in the light of available evidence— 
and yet it ultimately fails when fully tested against evidence. It is only after this failure that continued 
adherence to the theory would be unwarranted. If this applies with regard to scientific theories there is 
no reason it should not apply to theories with conspiratorial hypotheses: a conspiracy theory does not 
have to be proven, or “successful,” to be rational and warranted.
For the sake of analytical clarity, it is worth noting three distinct ways in which a theory might be 
unwarranted. First, as we have noted, a theory in the process of development and testing might be war-
ranted or otherwise depending on its being methodologically rigorous. Second, as we have also noted, 
if a methodologically sound theory is revealed to be substantively untenable in light of new evidence, 
then at that point— ex post— continued adherence to it is unwarranted. A third way is implied by the 
idea that there is something specific to a conspiracy theory— as distinct from any other kind of theory 
in any other domain— that generally makes it unwarranted ex ante.
To make sense of this latter idea, the question to ask is what do conspiracy theories in general 
presuppose, ex ante, that other kinds of theory do not?
The answer appears to be straightforward: what any given conspiracy theory takes as a premise is 
that available explanations of an event in terms of coincidence or incompetence are not sufficiently 
compelling to rule out the warrant for pursuing a conspiratorial hypothesis. The warrant for any partic-
ular conspiracy theory, ex ante, depends on reasonable doubt about the adequacy of available alterna-
tive explanations. So only in a situation where another explanation has already been established would 
the introduction of a conspiratorial hypothesis be unwarranted. Otherwise, a cogent and plausible 
conspiracy theory cannot be ruled out ex ante, including not on the grounds that official investigators 
consider it a less likely explanation than other as yet unproven alternatives. It is a quite typical feature 
of well- organized conspiracies that they aim to appear improbable.12 History shows that some of the 
most egregious ones have succeeded and that official investigators can sometimes be complicit.13 In 
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practice, then, the question is who decides, and how, when doubt is reasonable or not. Neil Levy has 
considered this question in a relatively dispassionate fashion:
‘Conspiracies are a common feature of social and political life, common enough that 
refusing to believe in their existence would leave us unable to understand the contours 
of our world; moreover, warranted belief in conspiracies is widespread, even among the 
intellectuals who confidently reject this or that putative explanation of an event as “just 
a conspiracy theory.”’ (Levy 2007, 181)
In practice, he suggests, it is not conspiracy theories as such toward which intellectually responsible 
people evince a reflexive suspicion but, rather, it is “conspiracy theories which conflict with (the right 
kind of) official stories that come under suspicion.” (Levy 2007, 181) The mark of a conspiracy theory 
that is irrational to accept is that it goes against relevant epistemic authorities.
Insofar as the criteria of relevance assumed are those of the highest available standards of logic 
and epistemology, this suggestion seems, in principle, a reasonable one. Due to the thoroughly social 
nature of knowledge production and transmission, all of us have to defer most of the time to others 
with respect to knowledge claims that we accept, so it is irrational not to defer to those with the best- 
established claim to relevant authority. However, the application of this general principle in practice 
depends on determining the relevant epistemic authorities in any given case, which, with respect to 
controversial questions, may itself be a matter of controversy. Moreover, precisely in cases where a 
conspiracy theory could be the right one there may be no relevant established authority to adjudicate 
because conspiracy theory is not— at least as things currently stand— a domain with recognized epis-
temic authorities! Certainly, there is nothing about the mere fact of being “official” that confers an 
authoritative guarantee of credibility on a story, as Levy recognizes:
“Clearly, it is often rational to heavily discount the official stories offered by some au-
thorities. In totalitarian countries, people learn to read the official news media with a 
jaundiced eye, and this attitude is often warranted. Recent events in Anglophone Western 
democracies demonstrate that this kind of attitude toward the official stories promulgated 
by governments and by their sycophants in the media is all too often warranted in non- 
totalitarian countries.” (Levy 2007, 187)
What Levy then emphasizes, though, is that while it is not epistemically irrational to reject offi-
cial stories per se, “there is a class of official stories that, other things being equal, we ought to accept. 
Responsible believers ought to accept explanations offered by properly constituted epistemic authorities.” 
(187) The important questions to consider, then, is who the properly constituted epistemic authorities 
are taken to be and how this should be decided. These are questions whose significance will be pivotal 
in assessing the case study in the next section, and so it is worth here recording the point that Levy adds:
“When there is a conflict between official stories, between the explanation offered by the 
political authorities and that offered by the epistemic authorities, responsible intellectuals 
are ready to believe the latter (regardless of whether either explanation cites the actions of 
conspirators).” (Levy 2007, 187– 8)
Our later discussion will oblige us to reflect more closely on what even makes a story “official”— and 
whose view should rationally be deferred to (where “rationally” means for epistemological rather than 
prudential reasons)— when political authorities and epistemic authorities diverge.
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As for what constitutes an epistemic authority, Levy's view is that “an epistemic authority is properly 
constituted when it has the right kind of structure.” (188) The right kind of structure is that exempli-
fied by science, where knowledge claims are the product of a socially distributed network of inquirers, 
whose methods and results are publicly available. Scientific inquirers “are trained in assessing knowl-
edge claims according to standards relevant to the discipline, and rewards are distributed according to 
success at validating new knowledge and at criticizing the claims of other members of the network.” 
(188) As Levy thereby emphasizes, scientific investigations tend to be pursued within the bounds of 
disciplines and in accordance with the methods, concepts and procedures appropriate to the discipline.
Accepting the general good sense of Levy's view— notwithstanding its arguable idealization of 
the purity of actual scientific research practices— and so granting its premise that scientific research 
does generally aspire to conform to the methodological norms indicated, its emphasis on disciplinarity 
prompts an interesting question for the present inquiry: is there or is there not a disciplinary home 
for conspiracy theory as a distinctive kind of inquiry? Differently nuanced answers to this general 
question might be offered, but we know that in the case of any specific putative conspiracy, depending 
on the particulars of the case, a variety of expertises are likely to be required to make headway. Each 
specific case, moreover, may require a distinctive interdisciplinary collaboration, with the mix of 
expertise required in any given case quite possibly differing from that needed in any other. What this 
means is that there is no uniquely determinable field known as conspiracy theory in which any scien-
tist or scholar could claim special disciplinary expertise. The field of what we might call “conspiracy 
studies” is inherently interdisciplinary.
What follows from this is that there can be no such thing as dedicated expertise in the field of 
conspiracy theory unless or until the relevant epistemic authorities have established the methods, 
concepts and procedures appropriate to the field. This insight casts interesting light on a concern that 
Levy expresses as part of the upshot of his argument:
“The intellectuals who embrace explanations of the kind that we typically and pejora-
tively label conspiracy theories are almost never in possession of the directly relevant 
expertise. They may be experts in something, but rarely do they belong to the class of 
enquirers with the authority to issue official stories regarding the event to be explained.” 
(Levy 2007, 189)
Our insight reveals Levy's statement here to be misleading in implying that an officially authorized 
group comprises anything other than a number of individuals each of whom is expert in something but 
not in the whole complex multidisciplinary field of inquiry relevant to a conspiracy theory. How would 
an “official” group differ— in terms of epistemological capacities— from another multidisciplinary group 
who were to gather together in an unofficial collaboration? Suppose the latter group challenged the epis-
temic authority of the official group?
This question can be considered in relation to a case of what Levy takes to be typical of a pejora-
tively labeled conspiracy theory. The events of 9/11, Levy points out, undeniably and unequivocally 
involved a conspiracy. Therefore, any and every explanation of the events must involve conspiracy 
theory. However, there is an official conspiracy theory that Levy says can be regarded as authoritative, 
and this is not because the official theory comes from the US Government.
“It is because the relevant epistemic authorities— the distributed network of knowledge 
claim gatherers and testers that includes engineers and politics professors, security ex-
perts and journalists— have no doubts over the validity of the explanation that we accept 
it.” (Levy 2007, 187)
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The problem with the opinion expressed here is that the “relevant epistemic authorities” cited represent 
but a subset of the engineers, politics professors, security experts and journalists who— along with law-
yers, eyewitnesses, financial market analysts, victims' relatives and intelligent laypersons— have engaged 
in serious investigations of the matter. It is by now a plain matter of fact that significant numbers of rele-
vant experts in the cited fields have articulated substantial doubts about the official conspiracy theory, and 
some of these can be found explicated in authoritative publications. It is therefore demonstrably correct to 
say that there is some doubt in relevant quarters about the epistemic unassailability of the official version. 
That doubt, moreover, has to be regarded by Levy as reasonable if its articulation has survived the kind of 
scientific peer review process that he asks us to grant as an epistemic warrant. Concomitantly, not all alter-
native hypotheses can be dismissed as patently absurd. It may involve speculation to suggest, for instance, 
that certain well- placed people in the West could have had some foreknowledge of events of 9/11 (Ryan 
2010), or that there could be doubts about the identities and provenance of the alleged terrorists involved 
(Kolar 2006), or about the precise cause of collapse of World Trade Center 7 (Hulsey and Quan 2020), 
but the suggestions are not irrational to entertain, pending more decisive evidence on the matters. Thus 
the problem with Levy's otherwise sound advice that we should defer to “properly constituted epistemic 
authority” is that when it comes to conspiracy theories there just may not be such an authority that it is 
uniquely rational to defer to.
Levy is aware that with regard to any complex situation that is a subject of conspiracy theory, 
“there is a holism of knowledge claims,” and he notes that “the official story enters into relations of 
mutual support with other knowledge claims,” but then he makes the problematic claim that “doubting 
the official story tears a hole in the web of distributed knowledge.” This claim— if taken as a reason 
for refraining from questioning official narratives— rests on an assumption that there is a unique, 
determinate “web” of distributed knowledge that is entirely sound, in all its threads, and in all their 
interweaving and intersection. Yet such a claim could not be made for scientific knowledge, since it 
would imply scientific advances that involved questioning received wisdom would never be made. 
So even were one to grant Levy's assumption that official narratives are supported by a structure of 
epistemic authority comparable to that of science, it would not suffice to support a claim that critical 
questioners of them are necessarily irrational.
4 |  CRITICAL RECEPTIVENESS IN PRACTICE: A 
CASE STUDY
The point of defending critical receptiveness to conspiracy theories is that sometimes investigations 
so designated by detractors reveal important truths. It has, of course, been noted that opponents of 
conspiracy theories claim that bona fide investigations are exempt from that designation and their 
opprobrium— so people who engage in such investigations should not properly be called “conspiracy 
theorists.” The problem with such a claim, as has so far been identified, is that the exemption is hard if 
not impossible to apply with any consistency, even in principle, given the lack of any decisive criteria 
for doing so. It is the practical significance of this problem that is to be considered now, for it brings 
us to the fundamental concern that has animated this paper. The reality is that the exemption does not 
apply in practice. Quite to the contrary, the disparagement of bona fide investigations as conspiracy 
theories is no less real a sociological phenomenon than are widespread beliefs in misleading con-
spiracy theories. This can have a disincentivizing effect on potential critical investigations that is to 
the detriment of a democratic society.
To demonstrate how real the concern is, this section examines a contemporary case study of how it is 
possible to engage in rigorous inquiry and yet be stigmatized— in public and even in academia— when 
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people choose to describe the inquiry as “conspiracy theory.” The study centers on a small group of 
citizen investigators from a variety of academic and professional backgrounds who were less sanguine 
about the epistemic authority of mainstream media than are those academics who would count among 
society's “mechanisms for generating warranted beliefs” ‘the free press, made up of reporters, editors, 
and owners who compete to publish “the scoop” before others do’ (Keeley 1999, 122). The group— of 
which the present author is a founder member— articulates reservations about the genuinely compet-
itive nature of news publishing today, given how its output reflects the homogeneity of its ownership 
and control (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Miller and Dinan 2008). Thus, a claim like Levy's, that “[t]
he media is, or is part of, a properly constituted epistemic authority” (Levy 2007, 192n3), would be 
regarded as stating an ideal rather than describing reality. It would not necessarily be assumed that the 
mainstream media “are, in the main, trustworthy” (Räikkä and Ritola 2020, 60). Certainly, whatever 
the merits of that sanguine view of the media in relatively uncontroversial domains, the impetus for 
the formation of the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media was concern about the media's 
role in reproducing what it regarded as disinformation concerning the war in Syria. This was a concern 
because the foreign policy supported by such information could be doing significant harm.
In January 2018 the formation of the Working Group was notified in a blog post responding to an 
article in the Guardian (Hayward and Justice 2018). Over the next two months, while the group was 
yet to publish its first briefing note, the former Guardian journalist Brian Whitaker published four 
articles seeking to portray its members and advisers as conspiracy theory promoters (Whitaker 2018a, 
2018b, 2018c, 2018d).14 By mid- April 2018, it had become the subject of an extraordinary attack on 
the front page, as well as inside pages and leader column, of The Times, which accused its members of 
spreading “conspiracy theories promoted by Russia.” In the following days, the attacks were echoed 
in the Daily Mail, the Daily Express, The Sun, Huffington Post and openDemocracy.15 At that time 
the group had still to publish any of its briefing notes on Syria. This fact serves to show that, what-
ever was the press's concern about the group, it could not be that the quality of its briefing notes was 
poor or misguided. Meanwhile, attacks on group members persisted, with some journalists launching 
them repeatedly, including Dominic Kennedy doing so four times for The Times and Chris York of 
Huffington Post producing a full dozen (as detailed by Johnstone 2020a). None of these contain any 
substantive critique of the group's briefings but they routinely feature the slur “conspiracy theorists!”.
It is a straightforwardly demonstrable fact, then, that Working Group members have been publicly 
stigmatized as conspiracy theorists.
Accordingly, the critical question to consider— if we follow the recommendations of scholars like 
Keeley, Clarke and Levy— is whether the group has or has not been engaging in rigorous and war-
ranted investigations. A constructive way of addressing the question would be by applying the ap-
proach advocated by Clarke (as noted in Section 2) to the Working Group's research program with the 
aim of determining whether it is progressive or degenerating. This would mean ascertaining whether 
it has been able to anticipate new evidence and make successful predictions.
One focus of the group's investigations has been on repeated allegations of Syrian government 
responsibility for chemical attacks in areas held by opposition forces. These allegations have had con-
siderable political significance to Western governments since the US declared such attacks to cross 
a Red Line that would justify a military response (Hersh 2014). Thus it was that the allegations of a 
chemical attack in Douma, on 7 April 2018, served as justification for a missile attack in retaliation 
by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The international institution charged with 
investigating the incident— the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)— 
enjoys a high reputation internationally and fulfills as clearly as any institution does the criteria for 
being considered an epistemic authority. Thus, according to the reasoning of Levy and other social 
epistemologists, to reject its epistemic claims would not be rationally defensible. Nonetheless, when 
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the OPCW issued its final report on the Douma incident— after an inexplicably protracted delay— the 
Working Group identified significant failings in it as judged by the standards appropriate to a scien-
tific report (McKeigue and Miller 2019a).
Now the Working Group is not composed of chemical weapons experts, even though it does con-
sult with people who are,16 and it did not visit the site of the attack: so it could not claim to have either 
specialist expertise or direct access to the evidence. These points are sometimes taken by the group's 
detractors as grounds to dismiss its claims without considering them. However, two things this dis-
missive response misses are the following. One is that no specialist expertise is required to know that 
a competent professional investigation of an alleged chemical attack would include certain kinds of 
information and to query their absence, particularly when there are other anomalies in the published 
information. For instance, there should be detailed reports from experts in ballistics/engineering (so 
as to explain how the munition was delivered) and toxicology reports (so as to identify the chemical 
used and assess its effects). The absence of detailed information of either kind constituted a significant 
anomaly that a thoughtful lay reader would know to query. The second thing, following from this, is 
that since the evidential value of physical access to the site resides in the findings to be presented in 
such reports, it is not clearly less rational to criticize the OPCW's failure to produce them than to ac-
cept conclusions it offers without close reference to them.
The Working Group's view was that since engineering and toxicology reports ought to exist, their 
absence from the documentation included in the OPCW's final report required explanation. And one 
obvious explanatory hypothesis— given the history of complaints about political interference in the 
work of OPCW (Landry 2017; Monbiot 2002)— was that the reports had been suppressed because 
inclusion of their detail would have been politically inconvenient to parties invested in the published 
conclusion. So implicit in the group's position is an inference to a possible conspiracy: the OPCW 
could have reached its published conclusions as a result of political steering rather than disinterested 
and unimpeded scientific inquiry.
If we call this implicit inference— that the report was nobbled— a conspiracy theory, the question is 
whether it is warranted; and a way of settling this, as suggested by Clarke, is to ask if the investigations 
generating it are progressive: in particular, do they generate novel predictions that come to be verified? 
A prediction directly implied by the nobbling hypothesis was that if suppressed reports should come 
to light their findings would be inconsistent with OPCW's conclusions published March 2019. This 
prediction might have remained unverifiable,17 but in May 2019 the group received a leaked docu-
ment revealing that an engineering assessment of the ballistics— signed by OPCW FFM sub- team 
leader Ian Henderson— had indeed been carried out onsite during the original OPCW inspection. 
The findings of this suppressed assessment substantially contradicted the conclusion delivered in the 
official published report, implicitly exculpating the Syrian government, and thus implying that the 
US- led bombing in retaliation lacked the justification claimed for it (McKeigue et al. 2019b, 2019d). 
The document confirmed a prediction and thereby provided evidence weighing in favor of the group's 
research being progressive.
The weight of further evidence was added when an OPCW whistleblower met with an interna-
tionally respected panel to testify, with corroborating documentation, that in the official report “key 
information about chemical analyses, toxicology consultations, ballistics studies, and witness testi-
monies was suppressed, ostensibly to favor a preordained conclusion” (Courage Foundation 2019). 
Thereafter, emails relating to internal struggle and malpractice within OPCW were published by 
Wikileaks (2019a), in turn followed by the release of further sets of documents in Wikileaks (2019b, 
2019c, 2019d) and additional whistleblower testimony (Maté, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d). A former 
senior official at the OPCW testified to a “toxic climate of fear” at the organization, and the OPCW's 
founding Director General, José Bustani, was so disturbed by the evidence of malfeasance that his 
   | 13HAYWARD
concerns were read into the record at a meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC 2020). As regards 
the inference to a conspiracy within the OPCW, as implied by the Working Group, the testimony of 
OPCW's own inspectors and others within the organization explicitly allege one.
So the Working Group's investigations can reasonably be considered progressive in that their pre-
dictions about suppressed reports contradicting the official account have been verified. To be clear, 
in making this point, no claim is being made or relied upon about the facts of the matter that OPCW 
was called to report on. At the time of writing, Western governments and OPCW management have 
not publicly accepted that the Douma report was nobbled, even though concerns about it are shared by 
a number of states parties, and not only Syria, Russia and China. For their part, the OPCW scientists 
who carried out the inspections in Douma are not arguing that their reports must be accepted but just 
that they be allowed a full hearing, in good faith. This urging, however, has been vigorously resisted by 
OPCW management and Western states parties: indeed, the inspectors have been subjected to smears 
in public and intimidation within the organization. Although this issue has largely been ignored in the 
press, a number of distinguished international figures have published a Statement of Concern urging 
that the suppressed evidence be heard at OPCW (Courage Foundation 2021).
What is significant for the purposes of this paper's argument is that the OPCW cannot claim there 
is a consensus view amongst either the states it answers to or the scientists it employs. The scientists 
with the most directly relevant expertise, who actually investigated on site in Douma, not only confirm 
the analyses in Working Group briefing notes— which would explain why the leaked material first 
took the route it did (OPCW 2020)— but add considerable further detailed information about the con-
cerns flagged. In these circumstances, to insist on deference to the epistemic authority of the OPCW 
as an organization is not so rational as it would otherwise be. OPCW's claim to epistemic authority 
with regard to the Douma investigation rests on the scientific expertise of the inspectors it sent there, 
and the latter have disavowed the conclusion superimposed on their work by the management. So this 
is a case where official authority and epistemic authority come apart: scientists and so- called “con-
spiracy theorists” are closely aligned, whereas opposed to both are representatives of political power 
and the authority it lays claim to.
For the purposes of this paper's main argument, this is all that needed to be shown with the case: 
the inference to a conspiracy— and one of considerable significance18— was not unwarranted. This 
serves to illustrate why the approach of critical receptivity is to be commended over approaches that 
depict “conspiracy theories”— as a general, albeit ill- defined class— as a problem in need of a cure.
Could this conclusion yet be resisted? Could critics of the OPCW whistleblowers suggest any good 
reason to think that their testimony was false or misguided in some way? Could they be seen as pro-
motors of a bad conspiracy theory rather than as reliable witnesses providing warrant for a credible 
one? Attempts to argue along these lines have certainly been made. Initially, when only the engineering 
assessment had been leaked, OPCW management— and also certain journalists who boasted an inside 
track to the organization19— sought to downplay and discredit the assessment, shifting, in the space 
of ten days, through three mutually contradictory reasons for disregarding it (McKeigue et al. 2019d). 
When the toxicology report was then also leaked, the various new evasive responses included the pub-
lication by Bellingcat of a fake OPCW letter aimed at diminishing the significance of the real findings 
(Maté 2020e). Meanwhile, every attempt to get the matter properly aired at OPCW meetings and even 
UNSC meetings was blocked by states aligned with the three that had bombed Syria. The general pattern 
of response— being evasive and inconsistent— is symptomatic of a degenerating account and one that 
is certainly not compelling enough to show consideration of the alternative account to be unwarranted.
So I maintain that the case study shows how it may be possible for an investigation that includes 
a hypothesis that could be designated a conspiracy theory to be warranted. It also incidentally shows 
how engaging in such investigations can provoke reactions from defenders of the official narrative 
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challenged. Notwithstanding the epistemic considerations that tell in favor of the Working Group's 
analyses, its members have continued to be vilified by certain journalists, politicians and government 
officials.20 Moreover, covert attacks— not only on the Working Group but on anyone challenging the 
public narrative justifying UK Foreign Policy— have been funded by the UK Foreign Office and other 
Government departments. These have been implemented by a range of bodies including the British 
Army's 77th Brigade (Coburg 2019; Hutcheon 2019) and the so- called Integrity Initiative (McKeigue, 
Miller, and Mason 2018).21 These entities have been implementing policy ideas that have been proposed 
and supported by normative argument from certain academics. Cassam (2019), for instance, thinks that 
because conspiracy theories are often “smokescreens for political ends” the aim should be to defeat 
them, using political as well as intellectual means (Cassam 2019). This echoes the view of Sunstein that 
“[b]ecause conspiracy theorists are likely to approach evidence and arguments in a biased way, they are 
not likely to respond well, or even logically, to the claims of public officials.” (Sunstein and Vermeule 
2009, 225) Hence his recommendation, published during his time as an adviser on information strategy 
for President Obama, was to enlist independent organizations to rebut the claims of designated conspir-
acy theorists and to engage in “cognitive infiltration” of the groups that produce them.
Could it be argued on behalf of Sunstein's position that even if the present case might be an exam-
ple of a warranted suspicion, it would be an exception to a more general rule which is not invalidated 
simply because it admits of a few exceptions. Sunstein is certainly aware that sometimes conspiracy 
theories are vindicated, and yet he considers it a lesser evil that the occasional exception is wrongly 
stigmatized than that dangerous conspiracy theories should be allowed to flourish. Hence he considers 
it justified to counter arguments of groups trying to hold government to account on behalf of citizens 
by means of cognitive manipulation and message control. Sunstein thinks governments should “hire 
credible private parties to engage in counterspeech,”22 for instance, and suggests that “government 
officials would participate anonymously or even with false identities,” for although this “risks per-
verse results,” compared with less inherently dishonest tactics it “potentially brings higher returns.” 
(Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 225) Such suggestions assume not only that the government knows best 
but that it is legitimate to constrain citizens to believe what government says, while systematically 
seeking to undermine citizens' coordinated capacities to raise questions aimed at holding it to account. 
A reasonable cause for concern in response is that the advocacy of coercion, social engineering and 
even covert infiltration of dissident groups in the name of protecting democracy from corrosive influ-
ence risks achieving the opposite result.
Viewed from the perspective commended in this paper, what the case study shows is that it is possi-
ble for investigative activity to be rigorous, progressive and significant while yet being condemned in 
influential quarters as “conspiracy theory.” The inquiry did not start from suspicions of conspiracy at 
OPCW; it started from noticing anomalies in a report, and indications of conspiracy only came to light 
as whistleblowers came forward. In retrospect, however, it is interesting to consider why the working 
group had come under such extraordinary attacks in the press even before it had started the investiga-
tion. One hypothesis would be that those attacks were intended pre- emptively to damage the group's 
credibility and to discourage emulation by others of its activities. But perhaps alternative hypotheses 
could be suggested by someone with a more powerful imagination than the present author.
5 |  CONCLUSION
The case study makes vivid the validity and practical significance of the argument developed and 
defended in principle, namely, that if an epistemic challenge to an official narrative is sufficiently 
troubling to warrant a response, then this should be critically receptive. It illustrates the reality that 
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even institutions with well- established claims to epistemic authority do not necessarily stand above 
political contestations over knowledge and truth claims. For this reason, skepticism about them cannot 
always or necessarily be condemned as irrational. When trust in institutions diminishes, the answer 
does not lie in suppressing questions about their trustworthiness or seeking to deter potential ques-
tioners. The fact that malfeasance by powerful actors does occur is ultimately itself sufficient reason 
to take an attitude of critical receptiveness to so- called conspiracy theories. Critical investigations 
that some refer disparagingly to as conspiracy theories can prove valuable assets in the protection of 
a democratic society; their suppression contravenes the most fundamental principles of a democracy 
and its associated values freedom of thought and expression.
This article draws on material from two previous papers that both received very helpful reviewers' 
advice, and this final version has benefited from further constructive reviewers' comments, so I am 
most grateful to all of them. Thanks go as well to fellow Working Group members, along with advisers, 
supporters, and other citizen investigators, for indispensable insights drawn on here.
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ENDNOTES
 1 Cassam, for instance, thinks “conspiracy theories in the ordinary sense are extraordinary,” so to mark this extraordi-
nariness he undertakes to capitalise the term Conspiracy Theory when used in what he regards as the ordinary usage 
of making extraordinary claims (Cassam 2019, 6). A question, of course, is how to know when or when not to use the 
capitalised term without actually investigating the claims being advanced.
 2 Räikkä, for instance, stipulates that “explanations that refer to conspiracies and are official wisdom are not conspir-
acy theories”: “Official explanations can (a) be theories and (b) refer to conspiracies, but they cannot be conspir-
acy theories— unless they are official explanations of wrong authorities. The view that the well- known events on 
September 11th in 2001 were due to a conspiracy on the part of al- Qaeda is not a conspiracy theory.” (Räikkä 2014, 
63).
 3 Accordingly, this approach is often referred to in the philosophical literature as particularism (Dentith 2016a). For 
Basham (2016), the tackling of particular theories one at a time is usefully complemented by critical investigation of 
how primary information sources may be supporting questionable official stories.
 4 There are some who believe not and commend dispensing with the term. Radical social critics like Bratich (2008, 
2011) criticize the idea of a distinction between ‘conspiracy theories and legitimate skepticism’. Even among the 
more thoughtful defenders of the distinction is acknowledgement that ‘what counts as a “conspiracy theory” (vis- 
à- vis legitimate exploration of real conspiracies) is a topic of continuous debate and disagreement.’ (Byford 2011, 
25) Byford recognizes conceptual difficulties in determining ‘where legitimate analysis of secrecy in politics ends 
and conspiracy theory begins’ and highlights how much this is a matter of political demarcation of accredited and 
discredited knowledge claims.
 5 This difference has been highlighted from the standpoint of those wholly opposed to conspiracy theory in the context 
of a debate that has unfolded under the auspices of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective by Wagner- 
Egger et al. (2019): they refer to the critically receptive view of some philosophers as a ‘“healthy” view on conspiracy 
theories’ and contrast with this ‘the “unhealthy” or “pathologizing” view held by the majority of psychologists … and 
some sociologists’.
 6 Interestingly, Michael J. Wood conducted an experiment to test the widespread assumption ‘that labelling something 
a conspiracy theory makes it seem less believable’ (Wood 2016, 696) and found it does not. Commenting on this find-
ing, Basham suggests that the label may only carry a pejorative connotation for certain sections of society, ‘largely 
limited to certain social elites, academia, mainstream media, and political and economic leadership.’ (Basham 2016, 
7) This, in turn, is consistent with oft- expressed concern from those quarters of connections between conspiracy 
theory and populism, a term used with sometimes unreflectively pejorative associations.
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 7 I am here assuming a quite minimalist definition of ‘conspiracism’, having in mind an analogy with other kinds of 
‘ism’— scientism, psychologism— that indicate an excessive or reductive attachment to an inappropriate mode of 
analysis. For a critical discussion of more expansive ideas about the psychology or character of people who tend to 
be drawn to conspiracist ways of thinking see Dentith (2017).
 8 This is not to dispute that research into the social and psychological bases of conspiracist tendencies can be inter-
esting and potentially significant for other purposes. Peter Knight (2014) offers an informative overview of multi- 
disciplinary research efforts in these areas. The studies in question relate to a variety of topics, including the varying 
political and cultural uses that conspiracy theories have served the individual psychology of conspiracy beliefs, and 
their symbolic dimension. Knight points out the need for interdisciplinary methodological reflection on the balance 
between psychology and culture in the accounts; he stresses the need to consider also historical and political dimen-
sions, in order to address the social dynamics of conspiracy beliefs.
 9 According to Uscinski's definition: ‘Conspiracy theory refers to an explanation of past, ongoing, or future events or 
circumstances that cites as a main causal factor a small group of powerful persons, the conspirators, acting in secret 
for their own benefit and against the common good.’ (Uscinski 2019, 48) This definition is more neutral than seems 
to be assumed in the work of some of his contributing authors. Regarding the term conspiracy theorist, he says ‘the 
authors in this volume have limited the use of this term and when they do use it, they use it so that its meaning is 
obvious.’ (Uscinski 2019, 51).
 10 Attempts to define conspiracy theory also have to define ‘conspiracy’, and although this is a matter that lies outside 
the scope of the present paper it is worth noting an obvious challenge. In seeking to distinguish rational scepticism 
from irrational conspiracy theorising Knight has invoked the idea of actors being ‘involved’ in events generated 
by a conspiracy but not being part of it (Knight 2014, 351). However, it is arguable that the tantalizing idea of an 
‘involvement’ that ‘falls short of an actual conspiracy’ would be an unhelpfully narrow definition of conspiracy if it 
were to exclude a whole range of subtle and implicit kinds of involvement that might include collusion, collaboration, 
conniving, tacitly understanding, secretly agreeing, jointly planning, acquiescing, turning a blind eye, covering up for, 
bribing, intimidating, blackmailing, misdirecting or silencing.
 11 The specific paper cited here was co- authored with Adrian Vermeule, but because Sunstein has written and spoken 
about conspiracy theory in numerous places, and has had the opportunity to refer to his ideas on the subject in his role 
as adviser to President Obama, I am following the precedent of other commentators (e.g., Hagen 2011) in focusing on 
Sunstein as the influential disseminator of the central ideas under discussion. These will be considered more closely 
in Section 4.
 12 The reverse side of this point is emphasised by those like Sunstein who complain that conspiracy theorists rationalise 
every rebuttal as further proof of a conspiracy at work. But while some conspiracists may indeed do this, the approach 
advocated here would impose epistemic discipline on both sides.
 13 As, for instance, with the US intelligence community's cover- up of what didn't happen in the gulf of Tonkin (Basham 
2016).
 14 The simple fact of such an intense interest being taken in an unknown and newly formed group of relatively obscure 
individuals might seem puzzling on its face but was contextualised at the time by Jonathan Cook (2018).
 15 For a list of these attacks and subsequent ones, with links to them, see this timeline: https://timha yward.wordp ress.
com/syria/ worki ng- group - in- the- press/ wgspm - timel ine- of- hosti le- media - cover age/ [accessed 20 August 2020].
 16 Piers Robinson (2020) notes that the late Julian Perry Robinson, one of the world's leading experts on chemical and 
biological weapons, was in communication with the Working Group. ‘At the time of his death, he was completing a 
chronology regarding chemical weapons and the war in Syria. Writing about the events surrounding alleged chemical 
weapon attacks in Syria and the vicious attacks against WGSPM, he noted that: “It is not immediately clear from their 
pronouncements that the critics of the WGSPM just quoted have in fact adequately studied the Group's publications.” 
… It was Julian Perry Robinson who subsequently invited WGSPM member Professor Paul McKeigue to present at 
the Harvard- Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons roundtable meeting in March 2020.’
 17 Something the case accordingly illustrates is why it would be a mistake to allow a general assumption, as Keeley sug-
gests, that ‘the credibility of conspiracy theories erodes over time as corroborating evidence fails to turn up’ (Keeley 
2003, 105). For unless further evidence in favour of the official story turns up, there is no shift in the relative weights 
of evidence.
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 18 Although mainstream Western media have largely ignored it, veteran journalist Peter Hitchens (2020b) called it ‘the 
biggest story I have handled in more than 40 years of journalism’.
 19 Three of the Working Group's most persistent critics in social media and the press— Brian Whitaker, Scott Lucas 
and Eliot Higgins of Bellingcat— claimed inside knowledge of OPCW deliberations at management level, which 
they deployed in attempts to downplay the significance of the leaked information and whistleblower testimony from 
OPCW’s scientific staff (McKeigue et al. 2019c, 2019d; Hitchens 2020a).
 20 For instance, Sir Alan Duncan, interviewed as Minister of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
responded to a question about the Working Group, specifically naming four members: ‘These academics dotted 
around the UK, whenever there is something pro- Russian, row in behind it in a coordinated way … We should not be 
taken for a sucker. We should realize what these people are doing together against our interest and against the interests 
of democracy more widely.’ (Haynes 2019).
 21 The latter, although funded by the Foreign Office, purported to be a charitable body engaged in education and public 
service information in the interests of defending democracy against Russian disinformation. For critical discussion 
see the extensive list of links provided in Hayward (2018).
 22 He is openly proposing conspiracy as a method: ‘If disclosure of the tactic does occur, however, the perverse results 
are just a possible cost, whose risk and magnitude is unclear. Another possibility is that disclosure of the govern-
ment's tactics will sow uncertainty and distrust within conspiratorial groups and among their members; new recruits 
will be suspect and participants in the group's virtual networks will doubt each other's bona fides. To the extent that 
these effects raise the costs of organization and communication for, and within, conspiratorial groups, the effects are 
desirable, not perverse’ (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 225).
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